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The development of bond markets (including asset-backed securities
[ABS] markets) has been a key focus of Asian central banks and govern-
ment agencies over the past decade (see Gyntelberg, Ma, and Remolona
2006; Gyntelberg 2007). The push to build ABS markets makes this chap-
ter particularly relevant as it seeks to provide a robust theoretical justiﬁca-
tion for their development.
The chapter oﬀers a theoretical model that explains how bank employees’
misaligned incentives cause them to extend too much ﬁnance to the real es-
tate sector, which destabilizes real estate prices and the broader economy. It
then shows how securitization better aligns bank employees’ and investors’
incentives. The chapter also provides evidence from twelve countries that
have experienced real estate market declines of at least 20 percent at some
point during the past two decades, which shows that banks’ excessive lend-
ing has a detrimental impact on real estate markets. Last, the chapter pro-
vides a discussion of current developments in ABS markets in Asia.
Overall, I thought that the chapter was good, but I have a few suggestions
that might improve it.
General Comments
• The chapter argues that securitization is particularly important in
Asia because it improves the transparency of the ﬁnancial sector and
helps lenders manage their interest rate risk and duration risk. An ad-
ditional beneﬁt of securitization is that it improves ﬁnancial stability
by removing risk from lenders’ balance sheets and dispersing it more
widely among a large number of less-leveraged domestic and nonresi-
dent institutional investors.
• The chapter discusses both residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) markets and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
markets and sometimes does not make a clear distinction between the
two markets. It might be worth focusing on CMBS markets as this is the
market for which the theoretical model and the real estate data appear
best suited.
• Excess liquidity and banks’ unwillingness to securitize loans are cited
as reasons for why ABS markets have not developed in Asia. It might
also be worth discussing how governments and market participants in
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of Australia.several Asia-Paciﬁc countries have tried to overcome these constraints
and build their ABS markets:
• In Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Malaysia, the government-
supported housing ﬁnance agencies have been issuing mortgage
backed securities (MBSs) to develop a market (see Davies, Gyntel-
berg, and Chan 2007).
• In Singapore and Korea, government agencies have bought some of
the riskier ABS tranches to help bridge the gap between the credit
quality of the bonds that investors in the region would like to hold and
the actual credit quality of potential corporate borrowers (see Gyntel-
berg and Remolona 2006)
• In Australia, new specialist mortgage lenders, that relied solely on
RMBS for funding, quickly built a presence in the mortgage market
and the RMBS market in the mid-1990s (see Gizycki and Lowe 2000).
Comments on the Theoretical Model
• The chapter argues that bank employees can hide losses from investors
and analysts because the bank has a large, diversiﬁed loan book. I am
not an expert in bank agency problems, but I have three concerns
about this argument. Banks often report separate results for each di-
vision. Banks that make underpriced real estate loans would also likely
underprice loans to borrowers in other industries, maybe undermining
the argument that losses can be hidden in the banks’ diversiﬁed loan
book. Even if the additional losses on real estate loans were within the
standard errors of aggregate loan losses across the whole loan book,
over time, the bank’s aggregate losses would always be biased upward,
and eventually shareholders would realize that losses were too high.
• I agree that securitization improves the transparency of lenders’ loan
books, but I am not sure that it eliminates agency problems. The abil-
ity to securitize loans was an important factor in the decline in lending
standards in the U.S. subprime loan market, as the companies that
originated the loans did not bear the credit risk.
• The disaster scenario does not appear to impact on the proﬁtability of
safe developers. This implies that safe developers do not invest any eq-
uity in their real estate projects. If this is the case, how are safe devel-
opers diﬀerent from risky developers?
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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
The authors have developed a model to explain why underpricing of risk is
not detected by bank shareholders and that its persistence results in com-
pression in the spread between lending and deposit rates, lending booms,
inﬂated asset prices, excess building, and real estate crashes. The model
may be described in ﬁgure 3C.1. There are ﬁve major players in the real es-
tate market, namely, the bank regulator; bank shareholders; bank man-
agement; real estate developers, consisting of both risky and safe borrow-
ers; and households who have demand for real estate, which can assume
three states with associated probabilities. In this model, a principal-agent
problem exists. Managers’ objective function is to maximize compensa-
tion. It is assumed that managers can hide bank losses. Thus, they engage
in underpricing risk, that is, lend to risky borrowers at safe rates. As the au-
thors have pointed out, “[S]uch underpricing behavior forces a race to the
bottom across lending institutions, with marketwide consequences.” Un-
der this situation, real estate markets decline more during market down-
turn in economies where risk is underpriced but reported bank losses are
expected to be lower than real estate losses. To mitigate the principal-agent
problem, the authors have oﬀered a solution: introduce mortgage securiti-
zation that will discourage lenders from underpricing risk.
Given the title of the chapter, it is worthwhile to describe the banking sys-
tem and real estate markets in Asia to see if the model and its policy impli-
cations are applicable to the region. As many analysts have observed, ﬁgure
3C.2more accurately describes the banking system in Asia than ﬁgure 3C.1.
In ﬁgure 3C.2, bank ownership is highly concentrated, and bank owners are
greatly involved in the management of their banks. Thus, the principal-
agent problem that exists under ﬁgure 3C.1 does not either exist or is less
pronounced in Asia. Even though a number of banks are publicly listed, the
listed shares as a percent of their total outstanding shares are signiﬁcantly
small compared to what can be found in more-developed economies. More-
over, many banks in Asia are either majority or minority shareholders 
of real estate companies and mortgage redemption insurance companies.
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